Generalizing Belnap's system of epistemic states [Bel77] we obtain the system of disjunctive factbases which is the paradigm for all other kinds of disjunctive knowledge bases. Disjunctive factbases capture the nonmonotonic reasoning based on paraminimal models. In the schema of a disjunctive factbase, certain predicates of the resp. domain are declared to be exact, i.e. two-valued, and in turn some of these exact predicates are declared to be subject to the Closed-World Assumption (CWA). Thus, we distinguish between three kinds of predicates: inexact predicates, exact predicates subject to the CWA, and exact predicates not subject to the CWA.
Introduction
In this paper, we shall address issues of disjunctive information processing, resp. disjunctive knowledge representation and reasoning, such as the interplay b e t w een disjunctive and negative information (concerning explicit negative information, negation-as-failure and the Closed-World Assumption), and the notion of inclusive v ersus exclusive disjunctive information. These issues have rst been discussed in the eld of disjunctive logic programming (see, e.g. [Min82, RT88, Sak89, GL91, LMR92]). However, there is no generally acknowledged semantics for disjunctive logic programs, and many proposals are not based on clear logical principles but seem to be rather ad-hoc. It appears that the non-rule-related issues of disjunctive information processing are complicated by the presence of deduction rules, and a semantical account for the interplay between disjunctive, negative and deductive knowledge is hard to nd. Therefore, we believe i t is methodologically preferable to settle these issues in a simpler framework without rules, and this is the approach taken here.
The concept of a knowledge representation and reasoning system, or shorter: knowledge system (KS), consists essentially of two main components: an inference and an update operation manipulating knowledge bases as abstract objects, 1 together with a set of formal properties these operations may h a v e. In general, there are no specic restrictions on the internal structure of a knowledge base. It appears, however, that a computational design can be achieved by`compiling' incoming information into some normal form rather than leaving it in the form of arbitrarily complex formulas. This is the case, for instance, in Belnap's KS which can be considered as a paradigm for knowledge systems.
The concept of a KS constitutes a useful framework for the classication and comparison of various computational systems and formalisms like, e.g., relational and deductive databases, logic programs and other rule-based systems. It is more general than that of a logic (i.e. a consequence relation). A standard logic can beviewed as a special kind of KS. On the other hand, by dening the inference and update operations procedurally, KSs can serve as the basis for the operational denition of logics. For instance, by appropriate settings of certain`parameters' in the system of disjunctive factbases one can obtain three-valued and classical logic, in addition to Belnap's four-valued logic.
In knowledge representation, two dierent notions of falsity arise in a natural way. Certain facts are implicitly false by default by being not veried in any i n tended model of the knowledge base. Others are explicitly false by virtue of a direct proof of their falsity, corresponding to their falsication in all intended models. These two kinds of falsity in knowledge representation are captured by the two negations, called weak and strong, of partial logic. In the monotonic 1 This distinction was already proposed in [Lev84] where the resp. operations were called ASK and TELL. base system of partial logic, weak negation corresponds to classical negation by virtue of a straightforward translation of partial logic into classical logic which is discussed in [HJW96] . In the nonmonotonic renements of partial logic based on (para-)minimal and stable reasoning, weak negation corresponds to negation-as-failure, and hence can be used to express local ClosedWorld Assumptions, default rules, and the like.
Both relational and deductive database systems can be considered as computational paradigms of real world knowledge systems. They implement a form of nonmonotonic reasoning caused by the use of negation-as-failure refering to default-implicit negative information. On the other hand, relational and deductive databases, as well as normal logic programs, are not capable of representing and processing explicit negative information. This shortcoming has led to the extension of logic programming by adding a second negation (in addition to negation-as-failure) as proposed independently in [GL90, GL91] and in [PW90, Wag91] . We call the general concept of an operator expressing default-implicit negative information in the style of negation-as-failure weak negation, and denote it bỳ ', while the concept of an operator expressing explicit negative information will becalled strong negation, denoted by`'. Our concept of a vivid knowledge system (VKS) is a two-fold generalization:
1. it extends already known logics, such as Belnap's 4-valued or Nelson's constructive logic, 2 by adding weak negation, and 2. it extends already known knowledge systems, such as relational or deductive database systems, by adding strong negation. In the framework of a VKS, a specic meaning is assigned to the Closed-World Assumption: if the Closed-World Assumption holds for a predicate, its weak negation implies its strong negation, in other words, an atomic sentence formed with such a predicate is already false if it is false by default.
In real world knowledge bases like, for instance, relational or deductive databases, it is essential to be able to infer negative information by means of minimal (resp. stable) reasoning, i.e. drawing inferences on the basis of minimal (resp. stable) models. Relational databases, being nite sets of tables the rows of which represent atomic sentences, have traditionally been viewed as nite models. On this account, answering a query F is rather based on the model relation, M j = F, where M is the nite interpretation corresponding to the database , and not on an inference relation. However, especially with respect to the generalization of relational databases (e.g. in order to allow for incomplete information), it seems to bemore adequate to regard a relational database as a set of atomic sentences A , and to infer a query F whenever it holds in the unique minimal model of A , i.e.
A `F :, Min(Mod(A )) Mod(F ) , M j = F While minimal models are adequate for denite extensional knowledge bases (such as factbases), a renement of the notion of minimality, called paraminimality, is needed to capture the inclusiveness of disjunctive knowledge.
Preliminaries
A signature = hRel; ExRel; Consti consists of a set of relation symbols Rel, a set ExRel Rel of exact relation symbols, and a set of constant symbols Const. 3 We consider the following logical functors: conjunction (^), disjunction (_), strong negation (), weak negation (alias negation-as-failure, denoted by ), exclusive disjunction (j), and the truth constant 1; relation symbols are denoted by p; q; r; : : : ; constant symbols by c ; d ; : : : ; and variables by x ; y ; : : : . Quantiers, 9 and 8, are only incidentally considered. If F is a set of logical functors, L(; F) denotes the corresponding set of wellformed formulas. L() = L(; ; ;^; j; _) is the smallest set containing the atomic formulas of , and being closed with respect to the following condition: if F;G2L(), then f F;F ; F G; F _ G; FjGg L ( ).
With respect to a signature we dene the following sublanguages: At() = L(;;), the set of all atomic sentences (also called atoms); Lit() = L(; ), the set of all literals; and XLit() = Lit()[ f l : l 2 Lit()g, the set of all extended literals. We shall frequently omit the reference to a specic signature, and simply write L instead of L(). We i n troduce the following convention: when L is a set of sentences, L x denotes the corresponding set of formulas.
An atom a 2 At is called proper, if a 6 = 1 . W e use a ; b ; : : : , l ; k ; : : : , e ; f ; : : : , and F ; G ; H ; : : :
as metavariables for atoms, literals, extended literals and well-formed formulas, respectively.
With each negation a complement operation for the resp. type of literal is associated:ã = a and g a = a, l = l and l = l. These complements are also dened for sets of resp. literals L Lit, and E XLit: e L = fl : l 2 Lg, resp. E = fe : e 2 Eg. We distinguish between the positive and negative elements of E XLit by writing E + := E \ Lit and E := fl : l 2 Eg. A model-theoretic system hL; I;j =i is determined by a language L, a set I whose elements are called interpretations and a model relation j = IL between interpretations and formulas. With every model-theoretic system hL; I;j =i, w e can associate a model operator Mod I , a consequence operation C I , and a consequence relation j = I in the following way. Let X L, then the associated model operator is dened as Mod I (X) = fI 2 I : I j = Xg, where I j = X i for every F 2 X : I j = F. The associated consequence operation is dened by C I (X) = f F 2 L : Mod I (X) Mod I (F )g, and nally X j = I F i F 2 C I (X).
An inference operation C is called correct, resp. complete, with respect to the model-theoretic system hL; I;j =i i C(X) C I (X), resp. C(X) = C I ( X ).
Partial Logics with Two Kinds of Negation
Denition 1 (Interpretation) Let = hRel; ExRel; Consti be a signature. A partial Herbrand -interpretation I consists of: 1. A set U, the universe or domain of I which is equal to the set of constant symbols, U = where a(r) denotes the arity of r.
In the sequel we shall also simply say 'interpretation' instead of 'partial Herbrand interpretation'.
The class of all partial Herbrand -interpretations is denoted by I 4 (). We dene the classes of coherent, o f total, and of total coherent (or 2-valued) All other cases of compound formulas are handled by the following DeMorgan-style rewrite rules: Formulas of partial logic (with two kinds of negation) can be normalized in the same manner as those of classical logic. For this purpose, we i n troduce DNS(F ), the disjunctive normal set of a formula F, which is dened as follows:
All other cases of compound formulas can be handled by the above and the following DeMorganstyle rewrite rules: 
Knowledge Systems
Before presenting the formal denitions, we start with a semi-formal discusssion of the basic concepts to be introduced, notably: knowledge base, query, inference, answer, information ordering, input and update. In general, a knowledge base (KB) can consist of any kind of data structures capable of representing knowledge, e.g. a set, or multiset, or sequence, of (logical) expressions, or a directed graph, etc. For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that a KB is a set of expressions from a representation language. Only certain formulas may make sense for representing knowledge, that is, there will be a specic representation language L Repr , and a KB will be a (usually nite) collection of elements of L Repr , possibly constrained in some way determined by the set L KB of all admissible KBs: KB 2 L KB 2 L Repr . Likewise, since not every formula may be appropriate as a sensible query, the set of admissible queries is specied by L Query .
The basic scenario of a knowledge system (KS) consists of two operations: an inference operation processing queries posed to the KB, and an update operation processing inputs entered by users or by other (e.g. sensoric) information suppliers. A KS restricts the admissible inputs to elements of a specic input language L Input , and an update is performed by processing the input formula in an appropriate way in order to assimilate its information content i n to the KB. Since it appears reasonable to require that any information entered to a KB can be queried afterwards, we shall assume that L Input L Query . F(x) is a tuple, and the set of all answers is a relation:
The formulation of a KS in terms of query and input processing was already implicitly present in Belnap's [1977] view of a KS. In [Lev84] it was proposed as a`functional approach to knowledge representation'. In [Wag94] the concept of knowledge systems was further extended and used as an integrating framework for knowledge representation and logic programming. where x is a variable (tuple) and t a constant (tuple). In general, however, an answer may be indenite, i.e. a minimal set of possible answer substitutions corresponding to a minimal disjunctive consequence:
Not all open query formulas can beanswered sensibly. We therefore require that queries are evaluable. 7 Answers to evaluable queries on the basis of denite KBs may be computed by means of relational algebra operations, such as projection, selection, set dierence, union, and join. For instance, Ans(KB; F ( x; y)^G(y;z)) = Ans(KB; F ( x; y)) 1 Ans(KB; G ( y;z))
In many cases, it is useful to be able to update by a set of inputs and wè o v erload' the symbol Upd to denote also this more general update operation Upd : L KB 2 L Input ! L KB which has to be dened in such a w a y that for any nite A L Input , Upd(KB; A ) = Upd(KB; V A).
We sometimes write KB+F as an abbreviation of Upd(KB; F ), resp. KB F as an abbreviation of Upd(KB; F). As a kind of natural deduction from positive and negative facts an inference r elation`between a factbase X Lit and a sentence i s dened in the following way: 8 See [vGT91] for the notion of evaluable, resp. domain-independent, formulas. also answered by \Peter". The only updates we consider are insertions, Upd(X;l) : = X [ f l g , of literals. For K Lit, we have Upd(X;K) = X [K. The knowledge system of factbases is then dened as F := h 2 Lit ;`; L ( ; ; ; _ ; j ; 9 ) ; Upd; Lit i
The restricted system where w e ak negation and exclusive disjunction are excluded f r om the query language, L Query = L(;^; _), is denoted by F + .
It is easy to check that KS1, KS2 and KS3 hold.
Observation 4 The inference relation of F captures model-based reasoning, resp. minimal reasoning on the basis of denite knowledge, in partial logic. Every factbase corresponds to the diagram of a partial Herbrand model, and for every F 2 L( ; ;^; _; j; 9) and every I 2 I 4 , it holds that D I`F i I j = F , and consequently, for every X Lit, X`F i X j = m 4 F where j = m 4 denotes entailment based on 4-valued minimal models (see denition 5). Whenever we deal with both kinds of negation, the strong negation is the principal negation operator (expressing explicit falsity), and the weak negation is an auxiliary negation operator (used, e.g., to express the CWA, see below). Sometimes we shall also make use of the symbol :standing either for classical negation (which diers from both and ), or for an arbitrary negation.
Regular Knowledge Systems
In order to compare knowledge bases in terms of their information content w e assume that there is an information, o r knowledge ordering between KBs such that KB 1 KB 2 if KB 2 contains at least as much information as KB 1 .
The information ordering should be dened in terms of the structural components of knowledge bases and not in terms of higher-level notions (like derivability). 9 The informationally empty KB will be denoted by 0. By denition, 0 X for all X 2 L KB , i.e. 0 is the least element of hL KB ; i.
In general, more information does not mean more consequences. In other words: answers are not necessarily preserved under growth of information. Queries, for which this is the case, are called persistent. The usual way to compare the information content o f t w o KBs in standard logic, namely by means of checking the inclusion of consequences: KB1 KB2 if C(KB1) C(KB2), does not work in a nonmonotonic setting. The property of constructive inference guarantees that, on the basis of denite knowledge, query formulas are decomposable. Obviously, the rst condition (of constructible truth) excludes the possibility of certain disjunctive tautologies such as the classical tertium non datur, whereas its negative counterpart excludes, for instance, the dual principle of contradiction.
The next property (due to Urbas [Urb90] ) excludes the possibility o f trivial inferences, i.e. non-tautological inferences which are solely based on the form of a KB and a query and not on their content. For example, fs(L); s(L)g m ( P;S) is such a trivial inference which i s v alid in classical logic, i.e. from contradictory information on Linda being a smoker, we may infer that Peter is married with Susan, and thus we w ould get (innitely many) unsensible answers to any query. This is clearly undesirable in a knowledge system. Denition 13 (Tautology) F 2 L Query is called a tautology in a knowledge system, if X`F for all X 2 L KB .
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Notice that this corresponds to the AGM expansion of`belief sets', see [G ar88 
Nonmonotonicity
The following denition captures the idea that a system is considered monotonic if all consequences of a KB are preserved after it is updated by some new piece of information.
Denition 16 (Monotonicity) A KS is called monotonic if for all X 2 L KB , and all F 2 L Input , we have C(X) C(Upd(X;F)).
Though fundamental in the theory of consequence operations due to Tarski, this is too strong a requirement for knowledge systems in general.
There are two`parameters' on which Monotonicity depends: the update operation may be ampliative or not, and the inference relation may be persistent or not.
Observation 6 A K S i s monotonic if it is ampliative and persistent. 12
Proof: For any X 2 L KB , and any F 2 L Input , we get X Upd(X;F) by Ampliative Update, and consequently C(X) C(Upd(X;F)), by P ersistent Inference. 2 Practical systems will be nonmonotonic since they will allow for non-persistent queries (by means of negation-as-failure) and for non-ampliative updates (by means of deletion, resp. contraction). 12 Or, rather exotically, if all inputs are reductive and all queries are`antipersistent', i.e. preserved under information decrease. It is still an open problem, whether { or under which conditions { the converse holds.
Vivid Knowledge Systems
The idea of vividness as a design principle for knowledge systems was rst proposed by Levesque in [Lev86] . However, while for Levesque the main issue was to have complete information, we have generalized and redened the notion of vividness based on two fundamental principles: cognitive adequacy and computational feasibility. 13 Denition 17 (VKS) A knowledge system K is called a vivid knowledge system (VKS), i f it is a conservative extension of A, the system of relational databases, i.e. if there a r e mappings f : 2 A t ! L KB , and g : L( ;^; _; 9) ! L Query , such that for any relational database X At, any input F 2 At [ At, and any query G 2 L( ;^; _; 9), Upd(X;F)`G i Upd(X ;F )Ĝ where we abbreviateX = f(X),F = g(F), andĜ = g(G).
It is easy to check that F, the system of factbases, is a VKS.
We distinguish between positive and general knowledge systems. In a positive KS, such as A, only positive knowledge is represented. In a general vivid knowledge system we have two kinds of negation: in addition to the weak negation (being able to express default-implicit negative information in the style of negation-as-failure), there is a second negation (called strong) expressing explicit falsity.
It is desirable for a KS to be robust towards any possible update. This includes inputs which are inconsistent with the current knowledge base. Such inputs may be erroneous, but it might beaswell the case that the new input is correct, and some old piece of information in the KB is erroneous or outdated. In any case, it seems important that the main functions of a K S a r e not corrupted by inconsistent inputs. Thus, a sophisticated inconsistency handling mechanism might prevent that both a query formula and its negation can ever be inferred from a KB even if the KB contains contradictory information.
Denition 18 (Inherently Consistent Inference) An inference relation`is called inherently consistent with respect to a negation operator :, if for every X 2 L KB and every F 2 L Query , it is never the case that X: F and X`F.
Notice that this holds trivially if we make the restriction that L KB admits only of consistent KBs. But such a restriction is not realistic. We shall assume, therefore, that L KB also contains inconsistent KBs. In this case, inference in classical logic is not inherently consistent. In fact, Inherently Consistent Inference is violated by any negation satisfying the classical explosion principle ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet, fF;:Fg`G. But Although we do not make it a strict requirement, it seems desirable for a KS that the following coherence 14 property, relating weak with strong negation, holds.
Denition 19 (Negation Coherence) A knowledge system with weak and strong negation satises Negation Coherence, if for any consistent X 2 L KB , and any F 2 L Query , X` F whenever X F .
Denition 20 (Minimal Change) 15 Let u 2 L Unit be any information unit. We say that Upd satises the principle of Minimal Change if it satises both Minimal Change for Unit Expansion and for Unit Contraction. For any X;X 0 2L KB , and any u 2 L Unit , such that u is consistent with X, we require the following: (Minimal Change for Unit Expansion) X + u := Upd(X;u) is the least extension of X such that u can be inferred, expressed by the conditions (+1) and (+2):
(Minimal Change for Unit Contraction) X u := Upd(X; u) is the greatest reduction of X such that u can be inferred, expressed by ( 1) and ( 2): ( 1) X u X ( 2) X 0 X & X 0` u ) X u X 0
A Further Example: Deductive Factbases
A deductive factbase is a pair hX;Ri consisting of a factbase X and a set R of range-restricted rules, called deduction rules. A non-ground rule r = l F may be formed with any conclusion formula l 2 Lit x , and any premise formula F 2 L x ( ; ;^; _; j; 9), such that 1) Free(l) Free(F ), and 2) F is evaluable. The set of such rules which are called range-restricted is denoted by R(Lit L( ; ;^; _; j; 9)). The name is adopted from [PA92] . 15 This principle was already proposed in [Bel77] Possibility 2: Revise current beliefs in the presence of contradictions. However: it seems to be dicult to determine the proper revision policy doing justice to both Mr. X and Mrs. Y, and it seems to be even more dicult to mechanize it in a satisfactory way.
Possibility 3: Just accept contradictions and report them exactly as they were told, so the user can make up her mind. Belnap advocates possibility 3, but emphasizes that even if the ultimate goal is possibility 2, i.e. revision, possibility 3 is a good rst step towards that goal.
In order to beable to process arbitrary input formulas F 2 L(;^; _), an epistemic state has to consist of a set of possible situation descriptions (corresponding to partial interpretations, Proof: In F + , for X;X 0 Lit it holds that C(X) C(X 0 ) whenever X X 0 . Consequently, Claim 4 (Classical Logic) Let X;F be as before, let At(X;F) denote the set of all atoms occuring in X and F, and j = 2 denote classical propositional logic. Then, X j = 2 F i Upd ex (Upd ex (0; X ) ; f a _ a : a 2 A t(X;F)g)`F 
Disjunctive Factbases
In a similar way as we h a v e extended the monotonic system F + to obtain Belnap's monotonic disjunctive KS in section 3, we now want to extend the nonmonotonic system F to obtain a nonmonotonic disjunctive KS. However, such an extension is not straightforward for at least two reasons. First, if we would simply extend the query language of B by adding weak negation, lemmas would be no longer compatible. This is easy to see. Consider the following example: ffpgg`p _ q but Upd B (ffpgg; p _ q ) = ffpg; fp; qgg 6 q while ffpgg` q 2 Consequently, w e should rather choose B m as the basis of our extension, since Example 6 (The CWA in Factbases) While we cannot assume the CWA for empirical predicates like smoker, we should also not assume it for the relation married in some local KB since p e ople may get married all over the world, and thus married will not be totaly represented i n a l o c al KB. We may assume the CWA, however, for a predicate like resident, simply because all residents of a city are registered in the local KB of that city. Thus, from the factbase X 3 = fs(S); m ( P;L); r ( P ) ; r ( S ) g over a schema with CWRel = frg, we may infer that Peter is married with a non-resident, Ans(CWA(X 3 ); m ( x; y) r ( y )) = fhP;Lig but neither that he is married with a nonsmoker, Ans(CWA(X 3 ); m ( x; y) s ( y )) = ; nor that he is not married with Susan, CWA(X 3 ) 6 m(P;S The Closed-World Assumption, in a less general form, was originally proposed in [Rei78] . Notice that our form of the CWA relates explicit with default-implicit falsity, i.e. strong with weak negation: an atomic sentence formed with a totaly represented predicate is (explicitly) false if it is false by default, i.e. its strong negation holds if its weak negation does.
Reasoning with Three Kinds of Predicates
Only certain exact predicates can be totally represented in a KB. Totally represented exact predicates are subject to the CWA. For example, the local KB of some city knows all residents of the city, i.e. the CWA holds for resident, but it does not have complete information of every resident whether (s)he is married or not because (s)he might h a v e married in another city and this information is not present. Consequently, the CWA does not apply to married in this KB.
The CWA helps to reduce disjunctive complexity which is exponential in the number of exact non-CWA predicates: if n is the numberof unknown ground atoms which can beformed by means of predicates declared as exact but not subject to the CWA by a VKB, then the VKB contains 2 n possible situation descriptions.
We illustrate these distinctions with an example. Let m; r; s ; l denote the predicates married, resident, smoker and is looking at, and let M;P;Sstand for the individuals Mary Without the CWA there are 3 tertium non datur disjunctions formed with m(P), r(S), and r(P), while with the CWA there is only one such disjunction: m(P) _ m ( P ) .
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V stands for disjunction.
Example 7 (continued) The DDFB from the previous example is the result of compiling the EDLP 7 = fp _ q; p_r ( p q ) g . Conjecture 2 The answer set semantics [GL91] of an extended disjunctive logic program can be captured by discarding all nonminimal elements of the corresponding DDFB Y : every answer set of corresponds to a stable closure of some element of Min(Y ).
For instance, the stable closures of Min(Y 7 ) are fp; rg, fq;pg, and fq;rgwhich are exactly the answer sets of 7 .
Conclusion
The system of disjunctive factbases which captures the inference relation based on paraminimal models is the paradigm for disjunctive knowledge systems. We have shown that there is an underlying general construction of disjunctive knowledge systems which can beapplied to all kinds of denite base systems.
